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Probability and Statistics in the Legal Curriculum: A
Case Study in Disciplinary Aspects of
Interdisciplinarity
2
Mike Townsend' and Thomas Richardson

I. INTRODUCTION

I do think ...
that the law was too parochial twenty-five
years ago and that despite all the false starts and silly fads
that have marred its reaching out to other fields, the growth of
interdisciplinary analysis has been a good thing, which ought
to (and will) continue. Disinterested legal-doctrinal analysis of
the traditional kind remains the indispensable core of legal
thought ....
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that we shall
3
soon (if ever) return to a serene belief in the law's autonomy
It is easy enough to grant Posner's general assertion about
interdisciplinarity, but it is much more difficult to describe
meaningful classroom implementations. This Article provides a
general taxonomy for various types of educational
interdisciplinarity. The discussion focuses, however, on what is
called crossdisciplinary education, using a particular
mathematics-based example to illustrate how crossdisciplinary
education can be used to ask law students to (re)examine law as a
discipline. 4 This is the third installment of a work in progress, the
goal of which is not so much to construct a definitive portrait of
1. Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A. 1973, University of
Michigan; M.A. 1978, University of Michigan; Ph.D. 1982, University of Michigan; J.D. 1989,
Yale University.
2. Associate Professor of Statistics, University of Washington; BA. 1992, Oxford; M.Sc.
1995, Carnegie Mellon University; Ph.D. 1996, Carnegie Mellon University.
3. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARv. L REv. 761, 777-78 (1987).
4. This Article treats statistics as a part of mathematics, although many consider
statistics to be a separate discipline that is part of the "mathematical sciences." In addition,
there is no real distinction made here between probability and statistics, although, for
example, some see probability as essentially deductive in its application, and statistics as
essentially inductive. See, e.g., Vic BAmrr, CoMPARATIVE STATISTICAL INFERENCE 8 (3d ed.

1999).
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law, as it is to examine what such a construction entails. 5
A consideration of interdisciplinarity must begin with a
discussion of the idea of a discipline. Section A of Part II describes
a "component-based" notion of discipline, the premise of which is
that the basic goal underlying the Western intellectual tradition is
to understand, appreciate,
and utilize our environment.
Understanding (i.e. science) involves classification, appreciation
(i.e. art) involves interpretation, and utilization (i.e. technology)
involves the means for providing sustenance and comfort. The
environment, however, is both complex and textured, and thus the
intellectual tradition centers on disciplines, which provide a more
focused approach to the basic goal. A discipline is at once a
science, an art, and a technology. The science component of a
discipline is characterized by the objects considered, the properties
studied, and the classification employed. The range of
interpretations given, and the symbolic medium used, characterize
the art component of a discipline. Finally, the technology
component is characterized by the methods and scope of its
applications. Within each discipline, the scientific, artistic, and
technological components work together to present a specific (part
of a) worldview.
Interdisciplinarity, the use of more than one discipline, is
important because it sharpens the resolution of the intellectual
picture by applying the perspectives of differing disciplines to the
most interesting aspects of the environment. Section B of Part II
presents a taxonomy of educational interdisciplinarity. In
multidisciplinary education, the student is exposed to a number
of disciplines. However, there is no essential integration in that
their relation, if any, does not reach a point where the student feels
that studying one discipline presupposes knowledge of another. In
pluridisciplinary education, the student does recognize that
studying one discipline presupposes some (possibly non-trivial)
acquaintance with another, but one discipline remains dominant. In
crossdisciplinary education, no discipline is dominant, but
integration does not generalize past a specific setting.
Generalization does occur at the fourth, and highest, level of
interdisciplinarity, but it can take two forms. In interdisciplinary
5. For previous installments, see Mike Townsend, Cardozo's Allegheny College
Opinion: A Case Study in Law as an Art, 33 Hous. L REV. 1103 (1996)[hereinafter
Townsend, Cardozo] and Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in
Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WAsH. L REv. 51
(1996)[hereinafter Townsend, Mathematics].
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education, the generalization proceeds so that a new discipline
begins to emerge at the intersection of several others. In this
Article, the word "interdisciplinarity"refers to the general
practice of using more than one discipline, and the word
"interdiscipinary"refers to a particular way of using more than
one discipline. On the other hand, transdisciplinary education
seeks to move beyond boundaries altogether by developing an
overarching, transcendent framework covering several disciplines.
In terms of the component-based definition presented here, law
is a discipline. Earlier articles comment on the art and science
components of law. Section C summarizes the relevant discussion
and makes some general observations about interdisciplinarity in
legal education.
This Article considers interdisciplinarity and the legal curriculum
in the context of probability and statistics. Section D of Part II
begins the discussion by sketching some multidisciplinary,
pluridisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary approaches.
Part III is the workhorse of this Article. The particular example
used here is the well-known jury discrimination case of Castaneda
v. Partidaas described in Section A. This "case study" provides the
basis for a crossdisciplinary experience that offers students an
opportunity to think about law as a discipline. It is difficult for
students to step back and look at law as a discipline when there is
no "back." The idea of the type of crossdisciplinary education
described here is not to make law students intelligent consumers of
another discipline, but to provide students with another vantage
point for thinking about law. That is, the perspectives given by
another discipline can be used to reinforce law as a discipline. This
is what is meant by the phrase "disciplinary aspects of
interdisciplinarity" appearing in the title. Studying the various
mathematical techniques described in Sections B and C provides
the vantage point here. As will be seen in Section D, students can
be asked to think about the individual disciplinary components of
law and their relationship, as well as the evolution of law as a
discipline. Moreover, students can be asked to think about specific
legal doctrine such as the nature of the prima facie case, legal
reasoning, and the presumption of innocence in the disciplinary
framework.
This Article concludes with some brief observations on the
importance of thinking about law as a discipline.
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THE LAW: DIscIPuLNARrry AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY

Man is a singular creature. He has a set of gifts which make
him unique among the animals: so that, unlike them, he is not
a figure in the landscape-he is a shaper of the landscape. In
body and in mind he is the explorer of nature ....
Man is distinguished from other animals by his
imaginative gifts... [so that] the great discoveries of different
ages and different cultures, in technique, in science, in the
arts, express in their progression a richer and more intricate
conjunction of human faculties, an ascending trellis of his
gifts.

A.

6

Disciplines

The premise for the component-based notion of discipline used
here is that the basic goal underlying the Western intellectual
tradition is to understand, appreciate, and utilize our environment. 7
Understanding refers to science. This use of the word "science"
connotes systemization and organization, as opposed to a more
narrow association with what usually are called the natural
sciences.8 Science involves the classification of the objects
appearing in the environment according to their important
properties. 9 These objects may be sensory or non-sensory, and the
exact nature of the classification, such as description, prediction,
prescription, or explanation, depends on the context. 10 This
admittedly is an older use of the word "science,"
but it captures
6. Jacob Bronowski, THE ASCENT OF MAN 19-20 (1973).
7. Nothing said here is meant to imply that other traditions lack these concepts.
8. For a discussion of this distinction, see David A. Funk, Juridical Science
Paradigms as Newer Rhetorics in 21st Century Jurisprudence, 12 N. KY. L REV. 419, 435
(1985).
9. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (1987) (giving as one
definition "a department of systematized knowledge as an object of study <the [science] of
theology>"). This Article does not address debates about the ontology of the objects
"appearing" in the environment.
10. An introduction to a general notion of classification is provided in Stephan K6rner,
Clasification Theory, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 691 (15th ed. 1974). For more detailed
discussions in specific contexts, see RICHARD B. BRAITHWArrE, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A STUDY
OF THE FUNCTION OF THEORY, PROBABILTY AND LAW IN SCIENCE 9-10 (1953) (discussing scientific
laws); CARL G. HEMEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE 135-73 (1965) (discussing natural and social sciences); W.S. JEvONS, THE PRINCIPLES
OF SCIENCE 673-734 (2d ed. 1877) (discussing natural sciences); THOMAS MUNRO, THE ARTS AND
THEm INTERRELATIONS (2d ed. 1967) (discussing arts).
11. Some even view this use as "obsolete." See, e.g., Barbara J. Shapiro, Law and
Science in Seventeenth-Century England, 21 STAN. L REv. 727, 727 (1969).
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the essence of one of the three basic dimensions of the intellectual
tradition.
Appreciation refers to art. This use of the word "art" connotes
aesthetics, as opposed to a more narrow association with what
usually are called the fine arts. Art involves the interpretation of
12
the environment through the creative use of a symbolic medium.
As with the concept of science, there is no attempt here to
describe these ideas completely. In particular, no effort is made to
develop the concepts of the artist, the work of art, and the
the intent
spectator. 13 Nonetheless, as with science and technology,
14
disciplines.
across
cut
that
notions
present
to
is
Finally, utilization refers to technology. This use of the word
"technology" is intended to connote application, as opposed to a
more narrow association with what usually are called the
engineering sciences. Technology involves the means employed to
provide sustenance and comfort.'5
The environment is both complex and textured, and thus the
intellectual tradition centers on disciplines, which provide a more
focused approach to the basic goal described above. A discipline is
at once a science, an art, and a technology. 6 A discipline is
characterized as a science by the objects considered, the properties
studied, and the classification employed. As an art, the range of
interpretations and the symbolic medium used characterize a
discipline. Finally, a discipline is characterized as a technology by
the methods and scope of its applications. Within each discipline,
12. See J. FISHER. REFLECTING ON ART 324 (1993) (stating "[flour major concepts
dominate traditional aesthetics: beauty, representation, expression, and form"); Dewitt H.
Parker, Aesthetics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ATS 14, 15 (Dagobert D. Runes & Harry G.
Schrickel eds., 1946) (stating "[tlhree general conceptions of art have dominated the history
of aesthetics: imitation, imagination,and eapression or language").
13. Any such effort would move far beyond the scope of this Article and into
controversial areas. See HUGH CuTLER, WHAT Is AiRT. 1, 3 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1983).
14. Cf. HELEN GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING THE ATS 318-28 (1932). No attempt is made
here to define the term "art" as it is used in connection with music, painting, etc. Indeed,
there is perhaps nothing more problematic. See HORST W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 9 (1967).
For a discussion of the problems involved, see Paul Ziff, The Task of Defining a Work of Art,
62 PHI. REV. 58 (1953). For a collection of classic perspectives, see FRIANK A TLLMAN &
STEVEN M. CAHN, PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND AESTHETICS FROM PLATO TO WITrGENSTEIN (1969). For
general overviews, see MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, AESTHETICS FROM CLASSICAL GREECE TO THE
PRESENT. A SHORT HISTORY (1966); MuNRo, supra note, at 49-109.
15. See WEBSTER'S NNTsH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1211 (1987) (defining technology
as "the totality of the means employed to provide . .. human sustenance and comfort").
16. For another component-based approach to the notion of a discipline, see Timothy
P. Terrell, Flatlaw:An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the Development of
Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CAL L REV. 288 (1984).
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the scientific, artistic, and technological components
8
together 17 to present a specific (part of a) worldview.1

work

B. Interdisciplinarity
Interdisciplinarity, using more than one discipline, sharpens the
resolution of the intellectual picture of the environment by applying
different perspectives to the most interesting aspects of the
environment. The major intellectual challenge for interdisciplinarity
today is fostering meaningful work in an information-rich era in
which it is difficult to master even a small part of a given field.
While the idea of interdisciplinarity can be traced back to Plato,
it was not until the latter part of this century that interdisciplinarity
was studied per se. 19 Although frameworks for interdisciplinarity
vary,20
the hierarchy presented here emphasizes the level of
integration rather than its operation or purpose. 21 Moreover, this
hierarchy is described in educational, rather than research, terms.
In multidisciplinary education, the student is exposed to a
number of disciplines, but there is no essential integration in that
their relation, if any, does not reach a point where the student feels
that studying one discipline presupposes knowledge of another. For
this reason, multidisciplinary education often is left largely to the
student. The obvious example is the stand-alone undergraduate
distribution requirement.
In pluridisciplinaryeducation, the student does recognize that
17. Others posit an antagonistic relationship Cf. DANIEL BEL, THE COMING OF
POST-INDUSTRIAL SocIETY 374-77 (1973) (discussing potential antagonism between "scientific,
technological, and cultural estates"); THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO b.X (Francis M. Cornsford trans.,
1941) (discussing potential corrupting influence of fine arts on search for knowledge).
18. What does it mean, after all, to say that students are taught to think like a lawyer?
The notion of the separation of disciplines can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle. See
T.7. LAVINE, FROM SOCRATES TO SARTRE THE PrmLOSOPmC QUEsr 76 (1984). The current scope
and organization of disciplines has been affected in part by the social and institutional
factors that accompanied the transition from the educated amateur, to the professional
society, to the modem research university. See ROGER L GEIGER, To ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE: THE
GROWTH OF AMERiCAN RESEARCH UNIVERSmES 1900-1940 20-27 (1986). For discussions of the
American version of this transition, see THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN AMERICA
1860-1920 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds., 1979); THE PuRsuIT OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBuC: AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC AND LEARNED SOCIwIES FROM COLoNIAL TIMES TO

THE Cr
19.

WAR (Alexandra Oleson & Sanborn C. Brown eds., 1976).
For a discussion of the evolution of interdisciplinarity, see JuiE THOMPSON KLEIN,
INTFRDISCILINARrrY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 19-39 (1990).
20. See KLEiN, supra note 19, at 55.
21. The terminology is based loosely on Joseph J. Kockelmans, Why
Interdisciplinarity?,in INTERDISCIPLINARrrY AND HIGHER EDUCATION 123, 127-29 (Joseph J.
Kockelmans ed. 1979) [hereinafter KocsELMAsS, HIGHER], and, to a lesser extent, KLEIN, supra
note 19, at 55-73.
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studying one discipline presupposes some (possibly non-trivial)
acquaintance with another discipline, but one discipline remains
dominant. The typical example involves a service discipline such as
mathematics used by a client discipline such as physics. At its core,
pluridisciplinary education forces students to realize that they must
be "intelligent consumers" of other disciplines.
In crossdisciplinary education, no discipline is dominant, but
the integration does not generalize past a specific setting. For
example, a student writing a paper on housing problems might find
it necessary to integrate materials from a number of disciplines, yet
the integration does not extend beyond the specific context.
At the fourth, and highest, level of interdisciplinarity, general
integration does occur, but it can travel in one of two directions. In
interdisciplinaryeducation, the generalization proceeds in such a
way that a new discipline begins to emerge at the intersection of
others. A biochemistry Ph.D. program is an example of the mature
stage of this process. On the other hand, transdisciplinary
education seeks to de-emphasize existing disciplinary boundaries
by developing an overarching, transcendent framework covering a
number of disciplines.2 There are, for example, "schools of
information science" that treat information creation and
management as unifying concepts cutting across disciplines such as
computer science and library science2
C. The Law
In terms of the component-based notion of discipline presented
here, to say that law is a discipline is to assert that law is a
science, an art, and a technology. The resulting legal worldview is
not only what makes it possible to write a book on comparative
law, but also what makes it easier for a lawyer than a
mathematician to digest it. Consider each assertion in turn.
The core of understanding (i.e. science) is classification. There is
no attempt here to provide any classification scheme for law. Law
students are well aware of the sort of pigeonholing typifying their
doctrinal and clinical courses. The assertion is merely that
classification is the heart of the scientific component of law as a
22. The notions of art, science, and technology are not transdisciplinary, but rather
parts of the definition of discipline itself. An earlier article critiques a particular example of
transdisciplinary research. See Townsend, Mathematics, supra note 5.
23. See Katherine S. Mangan, In Revamped Library Schools, Information Trumps
Books, Chronicle of Higher Education, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, April 7, 2000, at
A43.
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discipline. 24 The idea that law involves classification is nothing new,
and classification is an important part of both the common and
civil law traditions. 25 This idea of law as a science is explored
26
more in a previous article.
As an art, law involves the creative use of an interpretive
medium. An earlier article discusses the idea of law as an art in the
context of contract law.27 The article argues that theories of
promissory liability are interpretations in the legal media of (some
of the) typical answers given by students to the question of why
particular promises should be kept. For example, the bargain
theory is the legal interpretation of the answer "We had a deal!"
Cardozo's Allegheny College opinion creatively juxtaposes these
theories with an effect reminiscent of that produced by parts of
Mark Antony's funeral oration for Julius Caesar, his purpose being
to buttress the nascent Restatement support for reliance as an
independent basis of promissory liability.
The idea that law is a technology is perhaps the least
controversial of the assertions and will not be discussed here in
any detail.
Posner is correct in saying that modem legal education will
continue to draw on a wide range of disciplines, yet one might go
further. Some scholars assert that certain disciplines, such as
philosophy, involve more interdisciplinarity than others. 28 Law is
another such discipline. Indeed, one can argue that the
development of American legal education since 1870 is in fact the
history of three waves of interdisciplinarity; one based on the
natural sciences and mathematics as typified by Langdell's Harvard;
one based on the social sciences as typified by the Legal Realists;
and one on the humanities as typified by the current interest in
"texts" and "narratives".
One can find all levels of the interdisciplinarity hierarchy in the
modem law school. For many students, legal education is
24. For an exhaustive and provocative account of classification in law, see Jay M.
Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L REv. 661 (1989). For a general
discussion of the older conception of the word "science" in connection with law, see Harold
J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale
to Blackstone, 45 EMORY U. 437 (1996).
25. For an overview of various schemes of legal classification, see 5 RoscoE POUND,
JURISPRUDENCE 5-75 (1959).
26. See Townsend, Mathematics, supra note 5.
27. See Townsend, Cardozo, supra note 5.
28. See Carl R. Hausman, Disciplinarity or Interdisciplinarity?, in KocKiANs,
HIGHEP, supra note 21, at 1, 8-9.
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multidisciplinary in that they can apply non-law courses toward
their degree. In many instances, law and economics is treated in a
pluridisciplinary manner. For example, antitrust casebooks usually
begin with some discussion of microeconomics. Many
topic-oriented courses and seminars are crossdisciplinary. A
seminar in medical ethics, for example, might integrate law,
philosophy, medicine, and public health in a crossdisciplinary
manner.29 Jurisprudence can be treated in an interdisciplinary
manner.30 Finally, the notion of text and narrative is in vogue as a
transdisciplinary concept unifying a wide range of disciplines
31
including law.
D. Probabilityand Statistics in the Legal Curriculum
"For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be
the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man
32
of statistics and the master of economics."
Probability and statistics can be integrated into the legal
curriculum at all levels of the interdisciplinarity hierarchy.33 Law
schools not offering any overt discussion of probability and
statistics still can make a multidisciplinary experience possible by
counting probability and statistics courses toward the J.D. degree.
Law schools can offer students a pluridisciplinary experience. One
possibility is a physics/mathematics model in which students take
probability and statistics, as part of their prelaw studies, and law
schools develop specific probability-and-statistics-based units for
inclusion in a wide range of classes such as first-year courses, e.g.
torts, traditional electives, and specialized courses, e.g.
discrimination law. As an alternative, law schools can teach a
required, stand-alone quantitative methods course that presents
specific applications from previous law courses. 34 To provide an
29. Conversation with Professor Pat Kuszler, August 14, 1997.
30. Indeed, the University of California at Berkeley offers a Ph.D. program in
Jurisprudence and Social Policy.

31.

See,

e.g., PAULINE M. ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS,

INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 25-41, 124-27 (1992). See also, GARY MINDA. POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END, 149-66 (1995) (discussing law and
literature movement).
32. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L REV. 457, 469 (1897).
33. For another discussion of the general issue, see David H. Kaye, Thinking Like A
Statistician: The Report of the American Statistical Association Committee on Training in
Statistics and Selected Professions, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97 (1984).
34. Texts that can be used in such a course include DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS
PROOF:. FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE (1983);

DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY,
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interdisciplinary experience, law schools can offer a course based
on the sort of material covered in a traditional forensic science
program.3 Law schools also can offer a transdisciplinary seminar
based on the so-called new evidence scholarship, which seeks to
tie legal notions of evidence to an overarching notion of reasoning
encompassing a range of disciplines including law, mathematics,
sociology, and philosophy.3
The emphasis here is on crossdisciplinary education. Students
consider topics that no particular discipline can adequately address.
No discipline is dominant, but the integration of disciplines is not
generalized past the context at hand. As with pluridisciplinary
education, crossdisciplinary education certainly will suggest to
students that they must be intelligent consumers of other
disciplines. However, one can pursue a further goal of reinforcing
law as a discipline. That is, the perspectives given by other
disciplines can be used to reinforce law as an art, a science, and a
technology. This is what is meant by the phrase "disciplinary
aspects of interdisciplinarity" appearing in the title of this Article.
The remainder of this Article illustrates how one can pursue this
goal using the well-known jury discrimination case of Castanedav.
Partida.
Ill.

CASTANEDA

"The degree of underrepresentation must be proved . . . by
comparing the proportion of the group in the total population
to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors over a
37
significant period of time."
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION (1986); STEVEN M. CRAFrON AND MARGARET F. BRINIG,
QUANTTATIVE METHODS FOR LAWYERS (1994); WAYNE C. CuRTs, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR
ATrORNEyS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1983); MICHAEL 0. FINKEisrEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR
LAWYERS (1990); PHILLIP I. GOOD, APPLYING STATISTICS IN THE COURTROOM: A NEW APPROACH FOR
ATTORNEYS AND ExPERT WITNESSES (2001); STATISTICS AND THE LAW (Morris H. DeGroot, Stephen
E. Fienberg & Joseph B. Kadane eds. 1986).
35. Texts that can be used in such a course include C.G.G. ArTKEN, STATISTICS AND THE
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS (1995); DAVID H. KAYE, SCIENCE IN EVIDENCE
(1997); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994); ANDREA A
MOENSSENS, JAMES E. STARRS, CAROL E. HENDERSON & FRED E. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL
AND CRmAL CASES (4th ed. 1994); BERNARD ROBERMSON & GA VIGNAUX. INTERPRETING
EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURROOM (1995).
36. For an introduction to this scholarship, see Richard Lempert, The New Evidence

Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U.L REV. 439 (1986). Texts that can be
used in such a course include DAVID A SHuM, EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABLSTIC
REASONING (1994); JONATHAN L COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).
37.

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).

2002
A.

Disciplinary Aspects of Interdisciplinarity

457

Background

Discrimination is a good topic for crossdisciplinary study. There
are several relevant disciplines (e.g. law, mathematics, history,
political science), and it is difficult to label any one discipline
dominant. The focus here is on two of the relevant disciplines, law
and mathematics.
The specific example chosen for crossdisciplinary study is the
Castaneda case. For the purposes of this Article, the Castaneda
case can be described as follows. 38 Plaintiff alleged a violation of
his Constitutional rights in that his indictment was brought under a
grand jury system systematically excluding Mexican-Americans.3
According to the Supreme Court, "substantial underrepresentation
...
constitutes [a 14th Amendment equal protection violation] if it
results from purposeful discrimination."4° Moreover, "once [plaintiff]
has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has
made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the
burden shifts to the State to rebut that case."41 To make out the
prima facie case,4 2 plaintiff offered in evidence the facts that 79.1%
of the county had Spanish surnames, according to a U.S. census,
and that only 339 of the last 870 grand jurors chosen were
Mexican-American.
The next two subparts describe some of what mathematicians
might say about plaintiffs data. In particular, two statistical camps
are described: frequentist and Bayesian. Five somewhat parallel
evaluative approaches are presented within each of these two
camps. The discussion here is not exhaustive, as might well be the
case were the primary purpose to produce intelligent consumers of
probability and statistics. Rather, the topics are chosen to illustrate
how a crossdisciplinary approach can be used to reinforce law as a
discipline and encourage students to think about law as a
38.

In its broad outlines, this discussion owes much to RICHARD M. ROYAL4 STATISTICAL

EVIDENCE: A LIKELHOOD PARADIGM (1997), D.H. Kaye, What is Bayesianism?A Guide for the

Perplexed, 28 JumMrmcs 161 (1988), and David Kaye, Statistical Evidence of
Discrimination,77 JAN. STAT. Assoc. 773 (1982).
39. 430 U.S. at 490.
40. Id. at 493.
41. Id. at 494-95. The dissenters questioned whether this was an accurate statement of
the law, suggesting that prior case law required an additional showing that the selection
process itself provided a clear and easy opportunity for racial discrimination. Id. at 510-14.
(Powell, J., dissenting).
42. This Article focuses only on what the Court described as the prima facie case. In
particular, any discussion of notions such as purpose and causation is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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discipline.43
B.

The. Frequentists
"[A] majority of authors who present theories of [statistics]
favor a frequency interpretation.""
1.

Background

Some people hold that the "rules" of probability and statistics
"apply" only when it is possible to imagine a procedure that can be
repeated uniformly an arbitrary number of times. In the disciplinary
terms described above, the scientific component of probability and
statistics consists of certain definitions, theorems, and proofs (the
"probability calculus"), and the technological component depends
on repeatability.45 According to Richard von Mises:
We state here explicitly: The rational concept of probability,
which is the only basis of the probability calculus, applies only
to problems in which either the same event repeats itself again
and again, or a great number of uniform elements are involved
at the same time ....
We will say that a collective is a mass
phenomenon or repetitive event, or, simply, a long sequence of
observations for which there are sufficient reasons to believe
that the relative frequency of the observed attribute would
tend to a limit if the observations were indefinitely continued.
This limit will be called the probability of the attribute
46
considered within the given collective.

43. Indeed, the emphasis here is not meant to suggest that the frequentist and Bayesian
camps exhaust the field of probability and statistics. For example, some assert that the
frequentist position on probability has in fact been superseded by the so-called "propensity
theory" See, e.g., DONALD GuES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PROBABILITY 184 (2000). Nor is the
discussion here meant to suggest that probability and statistics exhausts what
mathematicians have to say about reasoning in the face of uncertainty. For example, some
mathematicians offer chaos theory or fuzzy set theory as an alternative to the probability
and statistics approach. See BARNEr, supra note 4, at 92-95.
44. Ian Hacking, Probability, in UTMTY AND PROBABILITY 173 (John Eatwell, Murray
Millgate & Peter Newman eds. 1990).
45. Questions about the ontological and epistemological basis of mathematical
definitions, theorems, and proofs are beyond the scope of this Article. For a general
discussion, see STEPHEN KORNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS AN INTRODUCTION (1960).
46. Richard Von Mises, Probability, Statistics, and Truth 11, 15 (2d ed. 1957). The
discussion of probability and statistics here is largely descriptive rather than normative.
Moreover, the camps and evaluative approaches are described informally in terms that hide
various internal disputes, and the description goes only so far as is necessary for the
purposes of this Article. For more complete discussions of frequentist premises, see GILUS,
supra note 43, at 88-112; ROY WEATHERFORD, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY THEORY
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It is important to note the general parameters of such a position.
Consider, for example, flipping a coin. A frequentist talks about the
probability of heads in terms of a typical, not a particular,
observation. That is, the word "probability" refers to the limiting
value of the relative frequency of heads that would appear in an
unlimited sequence of flips. 47 For frequentists, however, it is
nonsensical to say, "the probability is .5 that heads appeared the
first time this coin was flipped." This sentence refers to an isolated
nonrepeatable historical event that either did or did not happen.
This example indicates why the word "frequentist" is used.
This point of view is termed objective in the sense that the
concept of "probability" is divorced from consideration of personal
beliefs regarding uncertainty (or subjective) factors. Although the
frequentist approach is not the only objective approach to
probability, 48 it is chosen here because it is the dominant objective
approach encountered in the statistical comnunity.49
This
perspective is contrasted with a subjective approach in Section C
below.50
Consider
how one can abstract
the Castaneda
(under)representation issue so as to make it amenable to a
frequentist analysis. The idea is to use the Castaneda evidence in
conjunction with various hypotheses about the representativeness
of the selection process. Generally speaking, the hypotheses take
the form that the selection process is correctly modeled by
randomly selecting balls (with replacement) from an urn containing
some proportion of balls labeled MA for Mexican-American. 51 More
specifically, the hypothesis is described in terms of an assertion
about the proportion of MA balls in the urn.
it is important to understand that a frequentist does not, indeed
cannot, make a probability statement about the proportion of MA
balls in the urn as there is no repeatability for such a hypothesis
per se. Rather, the frequentist must tie nonprobabilistic statements,
144-218 (1982).
47. To emphasize the point made in the last footnote, there is no discussion about the
limit process or about the ultimate source of variation in the outcomes of the flips.
48. Another is the so-called propensity approach. For a general discussion, see GILLIES,
supra note 43, at 113-68.
49. See BARN=r, supra note 4, at 70.
50. There is some controversy about whether there are terms more appropriate than
"objective" and "subjective." See GnLiS, supra note 43, at 18-22.
51. This framework was suggested for the Castaneda-type context in Michael 0.
Fnkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination
Cases, 80 HARv. L REv. 338 (1966).
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for example, about the proportion of MA balls, to probabilistic
statements about repeatable events. The next few subsections
present some standard frequentist approaches along these lines.
2.

Assessing the Strength of the Evidence With Respect to a
Single Hypothesis: Fisher's P-Value

According to the statistician R.A. Fisher one proper goal when
applying probability and statistics is to describe "the strength of the
evidence against [a] hypothesis." 2 There are three things to keep in
mind about this approach. Most importantly, this approach is
descriptive as opposed to prescriptive. That is, there is no
suggestion that one act on the determination made. In this sense,
the approach is inferential, not decisionmaking.53
As an
inferential methodology, the p-value approach describes the
(strength of the) evidence (relative to a selected hypothesis); it
does not assess the validity of the hypothesis. In this sense, the
p-value approach may be called evidential as opposed to
validational.54 Finally, there is only one hypothesis of interest, no
alternative hypothesis is specified. 55
The hypothesis of interest in the p-value approach is called the
null hypothesis. As the Fisher quotation indicates, null hypotheses
often represent situations with respect to which one wishes to
make a negative statement. For example, null hypotheses often
describe a sort of status quo or "no change" or "nothing new"
situation.5 With this convention, the fact that 79.1% of the county's
population had Spanish surnames, and the Supreme Court's
statement of the prima facie case, an obvious candidate from the
Castaneda plaintiffs point of view is the hypothesis that the
selection procedure is correctly modeled by randomly selecting
balls from an urn (with replacement) with a proportion of MA balls
at least .791. This hypothesis is denoted by 0 -- .791.
How does one measure the strength of the evidence relative to
52. R.A. Fisher, Statistical Methods for Research Workers 80 (13th ed. 1958).
53. This Article considers the use of probability and statistics for inference and
decisionmaking. It does not deal with data summarization. For a brief discussion of data
summarization, see LLOYD D. FisHER AND GERALD VAN BELLE, BIOSTATISTICS: A METHODOLOGY FOR
THE HEALTH SCIENCEs 35-74 (1993).

54.

For further discussion of the first two distinctions, see Royall, supra note 38, at

55.
56.

For a brief discussion of this point, see BARNg'r, supra note 4, at 132-33.
Mathematical tractability is an additional consideration. Cf WHIIAM MENDENHALL,

1-5.

INTRODUCTION

TO

PROBABILIT

AND

STATISTICS

considerations in context of hypothesis testing).

206

(7th

ed.

1987)

(discussing

these

2002

Disciplinary Aspects of Interdisciplinarity

this hypothesis? A frequentist approaches this hypothesis by first
considering simpler hypotheses of the form 0 = .791. For obvious
reasons, the latter hypothesis is called simple, and a hypothesis of
the form 0 =- .791 is called composite. Consider then such a simple
hypothesis A. The procedure, roughly sleaking, is to determine the
probabilities of all observations that might have occurred if A were
true and report the probability of the collection of observations
that are at least as "extreme" as the outcome actually observed.
Thus, this procedure involves potential observations that did not
occur. The probability is called the p-value of the observation and
might be symbolized by: PA (observations at least as extreme as
that observed), where the subscript indicates the hypothesis under
which the probability is to be evaluated (here the null hypothesis).
The p-value is taken to measure the strength of the evidence
against the hypothesis on the ground that it indicates the rarity (in
57
the frequency sense) of such an observation.
This strength can be described by comparing the p-value to a
qualitative yardstick: a p-value less than .01 is said to indicate very
strong evidence against the hypothesis, a p-value greater than or
equal to .01 and less than or equal to .05 indicates moderate
evidence against the hypothesis, a p-value greater than .05 and less
than. 1 indicates. suggestive evidence against the hypothesis, and a
p-value greater than or equal to .1 indicates little or no real
evidence against the hypothesis.s
It is critical to note that a nonprobabilistic statement about the
strength of the evidence (i.e. the outcome actually observed) with
respect to a particular hypothesis is tied here to a probabilistic
statement about possible outcomes that could occur if the
hypothesis were true. This sort of "indirection" typifies the
frequentist position, and it should be borne in mind when
considering the remaining approaches described in the subsections
below.
57. See, e.g., ROYALL, supra note 38, at 65. The reader is not alone if she wonders about
an evidential approach that uses not only the observation that did occur, but also some that
didn't occur. Id. at 69.
58. See, e.g., WJ. BuRDErrE & EA GEI AN, PLANNING AND ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL STUDIES 9
(1970). Some suggest dividing these figures in half when employing the one-sided (or "one
tail") version of extremity considered here. Cf. Paul Meier, Jerome Sacks & Sandy Zabell,
What Happened in Hazelwood. Statistics, Employment Discrimination,and the 80% Rule,
in STATISTIcs AND THE LAW 13-15 (M. DeGrootS. Fienberg & J. Kadane eds. 1994) (discussing
issue in context of significance tests). There is a slight twist here as Fisher felt that a p-value
too close to 1 was suspect on the ground that data so closely fitting the null hypothesis
raised the possibility of tampering with the data. See FISHER & BELLE, supra note 53, at 222.
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Given Castaneda's interest in underrepresentation, it is
reasonable to take "extreme" to mean observing no more than 339
Mexican-American grand jurors out of 870 chosen. Ar standard
calculation shows that the probability of seeing no more than 339
MA balls out of 870 chosen from an urn with an MA-proportion
equal to .791 is vanishingly small, and thus the Castaneda data
represents very strong evidence against the hypothesis 0 = .791.9
What about the composite hypothesis 0 - .791? In Castaneda, it
is clear that the p-value with respect to an MA-proportion greater
than .791 is less than the p-value with respect to an MA-proportion
equal to .791. Since we are assuming that at most one urn correctly
models the selection process, one might say that the observation
also represents very strong evidence against the composite
hypothesis 0 - .791. In this way, one deals with the composite
hypothesis situation in terms of the simple hypotheses contained
therein.
3.

Assessing the Strength of the Evidence With Respect to
Two Hypotheses: The Law of Likelihood

Some frequentists deny the validity of the p-value approach. They
agree that it is proper to assess the strength of evidence, but they
argue that such an assessment can only take place with reference
to two hypotheses. Further, they do not accept the use of potential
observations that did not occur. Instead of using the p-value
approach, they perform the assessment using a certain ratio.
According to Richard Royall, this ratio indicates "how observations
should be interpreted as evidence for A vis-t-vis B, but it makes
no mention of how those observations should be interpreted as
evidence in relation to A alone." 6° Note that this approach is
inferential, in fact evidential, but it differs from the p-value
approach in that there are two hypotheses of interest rather than
one. As will be seen, however, this approach does not make any
distinction between the two hypotheses of interest by singling one
out as any sort of null hypothesis.
What is this ratio, and how does one use it to assess the strength
of the evidence relative to two simple hypotheses of the type at
issue in Castaneda? Given the simple hypothesis A and an
59. Approximately 4.2 x 10- 1. Calculations for this Article were performed with
EXCEL Interestingly, Castaneda'sapproximation is 10-140. See 430 U.S. at 496 n17.
60. Royall, supra note 38, at 8. This approach is characterized here as frequentist, and
this seems to reflect the thinldng of its main proponents. See Id. at xiii-xiv, 169-71; see also
A.W.F. EDWARDS,

LIKELIHOOD

xix (expanded ed. 1972).
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observation E, the likelihood is the probability that such evidence
E would have occurred given the hypothesis. Symbolically, the
likelihood is PA(E). Given an observation and two simple
hypotheses A and B, the likelihood ratio for the hypothesis A
versus the hypothesis B is the ratio of the likelihoods. Symbolically,
the likelihood ratio is PA(E)/PB(E). Roughly speaking, the law of
likelihood asserts that the likelihood ratio measures the strength of
evidence relative to the two hypotheses. 61 This law is offered on
the ground that if some event is more probable under hypothesis A
than hypothesis B, then the occurrence of that event is evidence
supporting A over B, and the strength of that evidence is measured
by how much greater the probability is under A. 62
This strength can be described in terms of a qualitative yardstick,
but one can also use a "calibrating experiment." Suppose that there
are two urns, one containing only MA balls and the other
containing an MA-proportion equal to .5. Three balls are chosen
from (an unknown) one of the two urns. The balls are MA, MA,
MA. The likelihood of this observation with respect to the
hypothesis that the balls came from the first urn is 1; the likelihood
with respect to the hypothesis that the balls came from the second
urn is 1/8, i.e. 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2. Therefore, the likelihood ratio for the
all-MA urn hypothesis versus the half-MA urn hypothesis is 8. This
simple example can be used as a calibration. That is, any likelihood
ratio of 8 can be said to have the same evidential import as
drawing 3 MAs in a row in this calibration experiment.63 In like
fashion, a likelihood ratio of 32 has the same import as drawing 5
MAs in a row, and so on. Using the general result that drawing n
MAs in a row yields a likelihood ratio of 2", one can even say "a
likelihood ratio of 47.5 has the same evidential import as drawing
approximately 5.57 MAs in a row in the calibration experiment."
It is natural to compare a given proportion with the proportion
that maximizes the likelihood of the observation. In the context of
Castaneda, one might present the following graph of the
likelihoods for an observation of 339 out of 870.

61. See RoYALL, supra note 38, at 3. One must distinguish this use of the likelihood
ratio from its use in other approaches such as hypothesis testing. See id. at 17.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id. at 11-12, 24-25.
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As should be intuitive, the maximum likelihood occurs at the
proportion equal to the observed proportion 339/870 (approximately
.390). Any likelihood ratio for two given proportions can be
computed by comparing the respective heights of the curve above
the horizontal axis. In particular, an observation of 339 jurors out
of 870 chosen supports 0 = 339/870 (i.e. 0 = .390) over 0 = .791 to
the same extent that an observation of (approximately) 474.7 MAs
in a row supports the all-MA urn hypothesis over the half-MA urn
hypothesis in the calibration experiment.64 As another aid, a
horizontal line has been drawn at a height 1/16 that of the
maximum height of the curve. Thus, the observation supports the
proportion 339/870 over proportions less than or equal to
(approximately) .351 or greater than or equal to (approximately)
.429 at least to the extent that an observation of 4 MAs in a row
supports the all-MA urn hypothesis against the half-MA urn
hypothesis in the calibration experiment.
It is not clear how to apply this approach to the composite
hypotheses 0 - .791 and 0 < .791, the composite hypotheses of
interest in Castaneda.s Indeed, it is the case that the simple
hypothesis 0 = .791 is supported over simple hypotheses about
64.

This corresponds to a likelihood ratio of (approximately) 8.0x10'4.

65. Note that such a choice of hypotheses makes no real allowance for non-urn models
as alternate hypotheses.
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proportions very close to zero.6 On the other hand, it has already
been noted that the hypothesis 0 = 339/870 is supported over the
hypothesis 0 = .791. If there are no grounds for a priori
distinctions between different possible values of the proportion,
then no general statement can be made about the hypotheses 0-.791 and
0 < .791. One can point out, however, that the
observation strongly supports proportions near 339/870 over
proportions near .791.67 Thus, composite hypotheses restricting
their attention to proportions near 339/870 and .791 can be
discussed using this approach.
4.

The Transition From Inference to Decision Making:
Fisher's Significance Test

At times, Fisher advocated something other than merely
assessing the strength of evidence relative to a single hypothesis.
According to Fisher, "it should be noted that the null hypothesis is
never proved or established, but is possibly disproved in the course
of experimentation. Every experiment may be said to exist only in
order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis."6
Once again, we will approach composite hypotheses through simple
hypotheses. As in the p-value approach, there is only a single
hypothesis of interest. As will be seen below, however, this other
Fisher approach can be said to have validational and even decision
making aspects.
How does one perform one of Fisher's significance tests on a
simple null hypothesis of the type at issue in Castaneda?6 Roughly
speaking, the procedure is as follows: one identifies a set of
possible observations, call it R, which has a small probability if the
null hypothesis is true. Thus, there is a high probability, assuming
the null hypothesis is true, that an observation will not fall in R.
One then carries out the experiment. If the observation falls in R,
then the null hypothesis is rejected. For this reason, R is called the
rejection region. If the observation does not fall in R, then the null
hypothesis "survives." The "logic" of this procedure can be
explained by the following. Recall from classical logic ("modus
66. The scale of Figure 1 should not deceive the reader. The likelihood curve does not
"flatten." Rather, the likelihood starts at zero for 0 = 0, rises to its maximum for 0 = 339/
870, and then descends to zero for 0 = 1. Even though the likelihood is vanishingly small for
0 = .791, the likelihoods are much smaller for O's close enough to zero.
67. For some general comments along these lines, see ROYAWL supra note 38, at 17-20.
68. R.A. Fisher, Design of Experiments 16 (8th ed. 1966).
69. There is a lack of uniformity on the terminology for the p-value and significance
test approaches. See BAR 'uIr,
supra note 4, at 133.
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tollens") that if A implies E, then from not-E one can conclude
not-A; on the other hand, if A implies E, then E does not allow one
to conclude A. Fisher's significance test procedure is the
probabilistic analogue: if the null hypothesis implies WITH HIGH
PROBABILITY that an observation will not fall in R, the fact that it
does fall in R justifies rejecting the null hypothesis. On the other
hand, the fact that an observation does not fall in R does not allow
one to conclude that the null hypothesis is true.70 Because there
might be more than one set of observations R of a given
probability, the force of this argument is stronger when the
71
rejection region is chosen ahead of time.
Significance tests have an evidential aspect. Their logic involves
a certain type of evidential interpretation of the observations, and
observations in rejection regions with smaller probabilities are said
to represent stronger evidence against the hypothesis than those
falling in rejection regions with larger probabilities. 2 In this
respect, the probability associated with R is called the level of
significance. Moreover, because the rejection region is chosen
ahead of time, the probability associated with R is the probability
of mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true.73 In this
respect, the probability associated with R is called type I error. By
picking R, therefore, one can measure and control the probability
of producing evidence leading to rejection of the null hypothesis
when it is in fact true. Typically, one picks a "tail area" region that
has a type I error close to, but not exceeding, one of the cutoff
points used in the p-value qualitative yardstick. 74
Significance tests also have a validational function; one either
rejects or does not reject the null hypothesis (i.e. the description).
In this sense, one is making an assessment of the validity of the
hypothesis itself. Note, however, that rejecting the null hypothesis
means no more than that the hypothesis is rejected. One may have
no specific alternative in mind to adopt. Moreover, not rejecting the
null hypothesis does not mean that the null hypothesis has been
accepted. Indeed, there may be other evaluations of the hypothesis
yet to perform.
70.
71.
72.
only the
note 38,
73.
74.

See ROYALL, supra note 38, at 72-73.
Cf. EDWARDS, supra note 60, at 177.
The reader is not alone if she wonders about an evidential approach that uses not
observation that did occur, but also some that didn't occur. See, e.g., ROYALL, supra
at 69.
See, e.g., ROYALL, supra note 38, at 119-20.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Viewed as a rejection procedure, a significance test has a
prescriptive aspect. That is, certain actions usually are taken if the
null hypothesis is rejected. In this sense, a significance test may be
termed "decision making," although of a limited sort.
In the Castaneda context, if a typical social scientist were to
perform a significance test for the hypothesis that the grand jury
selection process is correctly modeled by an urn containing a
proportion .791 of MA balls by looking at a sample of 870
selections, she would consider rejection regions with a type I error
close to, but not exceeding, .05. For example, she might choose a
rejection region consisting of an observed number of grand jurors
less than 668, with a type I error of (approximately) .044.75 After
choosing the region, she would make the observation.7 6
What about the composite null hypothesis 0 -- .791? As with the
p-value approach, one may deal with a composite null hypothesis in
terms of the simple hypotheses contained therein. The rejection
region above has probability less than .044 for any fixed proportion
greater than .791. Because at most one proportion could be the
correct proportion, significance test advocates would say that this
region is an appropriate level .044 rejection region for a
significance test of the composite null hypothesis 0 ->.791.77
5.

The Transitionfrom Inference to Decision Making: The
Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Test

The Neyman-Pearson approach is a multiple hypothesis approach
that can be viewed as a complete shift from inference to decision
making. In its traditional form, an experiment is, performed to
"choose" between competing hypotheses. Once again, simple
hypotheses are the stepping-stones to composite hypotheses.
How does one perform a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test on two
simple hypotheses of the type at issue in Castaneda? Roughly
speaking, the Neyman-Pearson procedure is as follows. In contrast
to the law of likelihood approach, a null hypothesis is selected. As
in the p-value and significance test approaches, the word "null" has
75. An R consisting of an observed number less than 669 has a probability of
(approximately) .052.
76. Of course, this raises the question of what one does when the observations are
made before the testing methodology is fully specified. Such a question is beyond the scope
of this Article.
77. See R.A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS AND SCIENTIFIC INFERENcE 49-50 (3d ed. 1972).
Although Castaneda is not completely clear on the point, the Court seems to be using the
p-value and significance tests approaches. 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
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a negative connotation here. 78 One then identifies a collection of
possible observations, call it C. An experiment is performed. The
null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis if the
observation falls in C, and the null hypothesis is accepted if the
observation does not fall in C. For this reason, C is called the
critical region.
But how is C to be chosen? The basic idea is to choose C so that
the resulting decision procedure is "good." In the traditional
Neyman-Pearson framework, the notion of "goodness" is measured
in terms of the two types of errors that one might make with
respect to the null hypothesis - the type I error, which is the
probability of mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis if the null
hypothesis is true; and the type II error,which is the probability of
mistakenly accepting the null hypothesis if the null hypothesis is
false, and the alternate simple hypothesis is true. But how is the
choice of C to be made with respect to these two errors?
Intuitively, there is some sort of tradeoff between the two error
rates. For example, taking C to be the set of every possible
observation yields a type I error of 1 and a type II error of 0, while
taking C to be the empty set yields a type I error of 0 and a type II
error of 1.
Suppose, for example, that one is going to draw five balls from
an urn with an unknown proportion of MA balls. Suppose a
decision is to be made between the null hypothesis that the
proportion in the urn is .5 and the alternate hypothesis that the
proportion is .75. Typically, one selects an upper bound for the type
I error first and chooses, from among the regions yielding at most
this type I error, a C that minimizes the type II error.79 Suppose, for
example, that one wants a type I error of at most 6/32. Among the
C's with at most this probability under the null hypothesis, the one
minimizing the type II error consists of 4 or 5 MAs. For this C, the
type I error is 6/32 and the type II error is 376/1024.
What about the two composite hypotheses of interest in
Castaneda; 0 - .791 and 0 < .791? 8° Again, composite hypotheses
are handled by considering the simple hypotheses contained
therein. Consider testing the simple hypothesis 0 = .791 against 0 =
0', where 0' is a fixed proportion less than .791. Suppose one wants
78. See, e.g., STEPHEN F. ARNOLD, MATHEmATCAL STATISTICS 288-89 (190); BARNtmr, supra
note 4, at 170.
79. See, e.g., M.HIDEGRooT, PROBABHIT AND STATISTICS 449 (2d ed. 1986).
80. Note that the use of such an alternate makes no real allowance for non-urn models
as alternate hypotheses.
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a type I error close to, but not exceeding, .05. With the typical test
procedure described above, standard calculations give a critical
region C consisting of an observed number of Mexican-American
grand jurors less than 668, with a type I error of (approximately)
.044.81 Of course, the type II error depends on 0'.
What can we say about this C? It is the case that C has a certain
type I error property, no proportion greater than or equal to .791
results in a type I error greater than .044. It also can be shown that
for any proportion less than .791, C yields the smallest type II error
for any region satisfying the type I error property.82 As a result,
Neyman-Pearson advocates would say that C is an appropriate .044
critical region for deciding between the null hypothesis 0 - .791
and the alternate hypothesis 0 < .791. 83
What exactly does "choosing" between the competing hypotheses
mean? Many people say that hypothesis testing is validational. As
one standard text puts it, "[t]he goal of a hypothesis test is to
decide ... which of two ... hypotheses is true."84 Jerzy Neyman,
however, argued against this description of hypothesis testing.
The terms "accepting" and "rejecting" a . . . hypothesis are
very convenient and are well established. It is important,
however, to keep their exact meaning in mind and to discard
various additional implications which may be suggested by
intuition. Thus, to accept a hypothesis H means only to decide
to take action A rather than action B. This does not mean that
we necessarily believe that the hypothesis H is true. Also, if
the application . . . "rejects" H, this means only that the rule
prescribes action B and does not imply that we believe that H
is false. 8

81. For a discussion of the mathematics involved, see, e.g., DEGROOT, supra note 79, at
442-49.
82. See, e.g., PAUL G. HOEL, StNEY C. PoeT & CHARLES J. STONE, INTRODUCTION TO
STATISTICAL THEORY 67-72 (1971).
83. See, e.g., Id.
84. LEE J. BAtN & MAX ENGELHARDT, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 389 (2d ed. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
85. J. Neyman, First Course in Probability and Statistics 259 (1950). Indeed, an earlier
example can be extended to show how a strict application of the Neyman-Pearson ideology
makes even an evidential interpretation problematic. Suppose again that one is going to draw
five balls from an urn with an unknown proportion of MA balls. Suppose a decision is to be
made between the null hypothesis 0 = .5 and the alternate hypothesis 0 = .75. Consider the
following two procedures. In the first procedure, one chooses five balls with a critical region
of 2 MAs. With this critical region, the type I error is 10/32 and the type 11 error is 93411024.
The second procedure is a randomized procedure. One chooses five balls. If 5 MAs are
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Decision Making: Wald's Decision Theory

For some, "statistics is concerned with decision making in the
face of uncertainty."s6 In this sense, the Neyman view of hypothesis
testing is a step in the right direction. As Abraham Wald noted,
however, hypothesis testing suffers from several drawbacks as a
general decision-making theory.8 7 One problem is that the notion of
the optimal course of action is somewhat limited, being restricted
to the consideration of error rates alone, without taking into
account the costs of the specific errors involved vis-A-vis the
actions taken.
How might a frequentist describe the Neyman-Pearson procedure
given in the preceding subsection for deciding between the null
hypothesis 0 ->.791 and the alternate hypothesis 0 < .791 using
more general decision-theoretic terms? 8s Roughly speaking, the idea
is as follows. The starting point is to characterize the actions
available. In this case, there are two possible actions: (1) what is
done if one is to accept the hypothesis 0 - .791; and (2) what is
done if one is to accept the hypothesis 0 < .791. 9 Next, one
defines a loss function that quantifies the loss associated with
taking the available actions. In this case, for example, consider the
observed, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis. If 3 or fewer
MAs are observed, the null hypothesis is accepted. If 4 MAs are observed, one generates a
random number between 0 and 1. That is, assume a uniform distribution of the type pictured
in Figure 4 injfr. See, e.g., DEGROOr, supra note 79, at 103-05. One rejects the null
hypothesis if the random number is less than or equal to .12. That is, one rejects 100% of the
time on 5 MAs and 12% of the time on four MAs. Comparing the two procedures requires
reconceptualizing the nonrandomized procedure so that it is a special case of the collection
of randomized procedures; these details are beyond the scope of this Article. For a
discussion, see ARNOLD, supra note 78, at 306-08. With the suitable theoretical framework, it
can be shown that the randomized procedure has a type I error of .05 and a type I error of
732.411024. If one is interested only in error rates, there is no obvious reason not to prefer
the randomized procedure. Yet there is an obvious evidential concern, how can one interpret
the random number in terms of (the strength of) evidence for or against either of these
hypotheses? This example casts doubt on inferential interpretations of hypothesis testing in
general. For a discussion of some other "paradoxes" involving a strict application of
Neyman-Pearson techniques, see Michael D. Perlman & Lang Wu, The Emperor's New Tests,
14 STAT. SCL 355 (1999).
86. Herman Chernoff & Lincoln E. Moses, Elementary Decision Theory 1 (Dover ed.
1986).
87. See ABRAHAM WALD, STATISTICAL DECISION FUNCIONS V (1950).
88. Some decision theorists do not like to use the word "hypothesis" because it
incorrectly implies that the goal is to determine truth or falsity rather than to make
decisions. See, e.g., JOHN W. PRTr, HOWARD RAtFFA & ROBERT SCHLAIFER, INTRODUCrION TO
STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY 529 (1995).

89. Again, there is no real allowance here for non-urn procedures as alternate
hypotheses.
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loss function specifying a loss of 1 if the wrong hypothesis is
accepted, and a loss of 0 otherwise 0 Then, one defines a set of
possible observations. Here, it is the number of Mexican-American
grand jurors selected out of 870. One then defines a decision
procedure that specifies the action to be taken upon any
observation. In this example, the decision procedure is to accept 0
> .791 if there are at least 668 Mexican-American grand jurors and
accept the hypothesis 0 < .791 otherwise.
The decision-theoretic approach begins by considering the risk
function associated with a given decision procedure. In the
Castaneda context, the risk function can be thought of as
measuring the risk under the assumption that the selection process
is correctly modeled by selecting balls from an urn with a given
proportion of MA balls. More specifically, the risk of the procedure
for a particular assumed-to-be-true proportion is obtained by
"aggregating" the losses over all possible observations, where the
aggregation is done by weighing the loss by the probability under
the assumed proportion. With the Neyman-Pearson procedure
described above, the following can denote the risk function:
I
RNp(0') =

x Pe - o. (less than 668 in
x Pg.9. (at least 668 in 870) ifO' <.791

870)

if 8'

?

.791

A frequentist sees this risk function as measuring the
performance of the Neyman-Pearson procedure in the sense of
giving the average loss over repeated applications of the procedure
that occurs if the selection process is correctly modeled by
selecting balls from an urn with proportion 0'.
It can be shown that the Neyman-Pearson decision procedure
described above is acceptable or admissible in the sense that for
any other decision procedure d with risk function Rd, if there is a
0' with Rd(o') < RNp(O'), then there is a 0" with Rd(O") > RNp(O"). 91
In most situations, nonadmissible decision procedures have little to
suggest themselves in terms of the risk-evaluating
92
decision-theoretic perspective.
There are, however, many admissible decision procedures here.90
90. Gains would be indicated with negative numbers.
91. See, e.g., CHERNOFF & MOSES, supra note 86, at 338-39.
92. There are some situations in which they may be considered. See, e.g., GEORGE
CASELLA & ROGER L BERGER, STA'nMSCAL INFERENCE 480 (1990).
93. See, e.g., CHERNOFF & MOSES, supra note 86, at 338-39.
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Is there anything else to recommend this one? Noting that the two
probabilities appearing in the risk function represent type I and
type II errors, one can describe an additional property of this risk
function in terms of the error analysis of the Neyman-Pearson
procedure discussed in the preceding subsection. Such a
description, however, seems to have little to offer from a
decision-theoretic perspective 4
If there are no grounds for a priori distinctions between
different possible values of the proportion, frequentists are largely
9 5 Roughly
left with intuitive criteria such as the Minimax Property.
speaking, a decision procedure satisfies the Minimax Property if it
has the smallest possible maximum risk, where the maximum risk
for a decision procedure is the "largest value" taken on by the risk
function. 6 That is, one seeks to minimize the worst possible long
run average loss.
In this example, there is a decision procedure that is admissible
and minimax. It is a randomized procedure.97 If the number of
Mexican-American grand jurors selected is greater than 688, accept
the hypothesis 0 ->.791. If-the number is less than 688, accept the
hypothesis 0 < .791. If the number is 688, one generates a random
number between 0 and 1, accepting the hypothesis 0 < .791 if the
random number is less than or equal to (approximately) .767.98 In
this context with the 0-1 loss structure, the maximum risk for this
procedure is 1/2. Noting that the randomized procedure is roughly
stated "accept 0 - .791 if the observed proportion of grand jurors
selected is greater than or equal to .791 and accept 0 < .791
otherwise," the reader should not be surprised to discover that the
procedure has some reasonable properties. The maximum risk for
the Neyman-Pearson procedure is (approximately) .956.9
C.

The Bayesians
"[T]he Bayesian approach continues to gain adherents, but
• . . there is still some way to go before we live in a fully

94. See, e.g., BA~scrr, supra note 4, at 284-85.
95. Id. at 267.
96. Actually, the least upper bound of the values.
97. For a discussion of randomized procedures, see ARNOLD, supra note 78, at 306-08.
98. That is, assume a uniform distribution of the type pictured in Figure 4. See, e.g.,
DEGRooT, supra note 79, at 103-05.
99. This number is in fact the least upper bound of the risks and is obtained as 0
approaches .791 from below.
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Bayesian world." 1°°
1.

Background

Some people assert that applying probability and statistics is
about "individual degrees of belief," not some objective notion of
the long run. According to Bruno de Finetti:
The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about . . . Fairies
and Witches was an essential step along the road to scientific
thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed
with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading
misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize our true
probabilistic beliefs.
In investigating the reasonableness of our own modes of
thought and behavior under uncertainty, all we require, and all
that we are reasonably entitled to, is consistency among these
beliefs, and their reasonable relation to any kind of relevant
objective data ("relevant" in as much as subjectively deemed
to be so). This is Probability Theory. 10
The coin-flipping example again illustrates the parameters of
such a position. Basically, a Bayesian talks about the probability of
heads in terms of a particular, not a typical, observation. That is,
the word "probability" refers to a specified situation or individual
occurrence. Indeed, contrary to the frequentist view, it is not
nonsense to say, "The probability is .5 that heads appeared the first
time this coin was flipped." The sentence describes the speaker's
degree of belief in this isolated historical event. According to this
view of probability, individuals may disagree on the strengths of
their beliefs, but they will agree on the mathematical rules obeyed,
the most important of which is known as Bayes' Theorem (hence
the term "Bayesian").' °2
Bayesians assert that the mathematical rules allow us to update
our beliefs in the light of new evidence. According to one Bayesian:
"In broad outline, we take prior beliefs about various possible
100. Peter M. Lee, Bayesian Statistics: An Introduction viii (2d ed. 1997).
101. Bruno de Finetti, THEORY OF PROBABILITY, A CRrTCAL INTRODUCrORY TREATMENT, Vol.
1, x (1970). For general discussions of such a position, see Gniaus, supra note 43, at 50-87;
WEATHERFORD, supm note 46, at 219-42.
102. Although there is some debate about whether an approach emphasizing Bayes'
Theorem requires a degree-of-belief notion of probability, this Article takes the increasingly
prevalent position that it does. For a general discussion of the issue, see BARNErr, supra
note 4, at 207, 242-49.
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hypotheses and then modify these prior beliefs in the light of
relevant data which we have collected in order to arrive at
posterior beliefs."103
This point of view is termed subjective in the sense that under
this view the concept of "probability" involves consideration of a
personal degree of belief. For this reason, frequentists and
Bayesians have coexisted in a somewhat uneasy tension within the
statistics communitY.104
In the disciplinary terms of this Article, the debate between
frequentists and Bayesians is less a debate about the scientific
component of probability and statistics than it is a debate about
the technological component. That is, there is less debate about the
probability calculus per se than there is about the proper
application.10 5
Consider how one can abstract the Castaneda. (under)
representation issue so as to make it amenable to Bayesian
analysis. For the purposes of this Article, the interest once again is
in assertions that the selection process is correctly modeled in
terms of selecting balls from an urn containing some proportion 0
of balls labeled MA for Mexican-American. Bayesians assign
degrees of belief to various assertions (i.e. hypotheses) about the
proportion 0. The task is to update these degrees of belief in light
of the evidence that there were 339 Mexican-American grand jurors
out of 870 chosen.
To illustrate the basic ideas, consider the universe of possible
proportions to be finite. That is, consider what can be called a
discrete approach. For example, one might assume that the
possible proportions are .25, .5, .791, and .9. One assigns a prior
probability or prior degree of belief to each of these proportions in
such a way that the prior probabilities sum to 1. For example, one
might assign the prior probability .1 to the assertion 0 = .25, the
prior probability .15 to the assertion 0 = .5, the prior probability .5
to the assertion 0 = .791, and the prior probability .25 to the
assertion 0 = .9. With reference to Figure 2, these prior
probabilities can be pictured by a graph wherein the height of the
line above the horizontal axis is the prior probability.

103. Lee, supra note 100, at 33.
104. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 78, at 568-70.
105. See, e.g., BARNmrr, supra note 4, at 72-73.
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Figure 2
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Using Bayes' Theorem, one updates these prior probabilities to
produce posterior probabilities or posterior degrees of belief for
these four proportions. In this context, Bayes' Theorem says that
the posterior probability of a fixed proportion 0' given the evidence
E is proportional to the product of (1) the likelihood (P(Ei 0 = 0')),
and (2) the prior probability of the proportion (P(0 = 0')).
Symbolically,
P(0 = 0'iE) = cxP(Ei0 = 0') xP(0 = 0')
where "I"is read "given". The notation indicates that, as opposed
to the frequentist perspective, the hypothesis itself has a probability
attached to it. Thus, the likelihood is symbolized by P(EI 0 = 0'),
rather than P0 = 0'(E). The constant of proportionality c is such
that the posterior probabilities sum to 1. In this example,
P(0 = .251339 of 870) =

cxP(339 of 87010 = .25)xP(0 = .25),
P(0 = .51339 of 870) =

cxP(339 of 87010 = .5)xP(0 = .5),
P(0 = .7911339 of 870) =
cxP(339 of 87010 = .791)x P(0 = .791), and
P(0 = .91339 of 870) cxP(339 of 87010 = .9)xP(0 = .9).
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Here, P(0 = .25) = .1, P(O= .5) = .15, P(O = .791) = .5, and P(O=
.9) =.25. In this example, the extreme nature of the observation
yields a posterior probability of very nearly 1 for the proportion .5,
which .is the proportion closest to the observed proportion 339/870.
The posterior probabilities for the remaining proportions are
vanishingly small.106 One might consider it more reasonable to take
the universe of possible proportions to consist of all proportions
between 0 and 1. This can be called a continuous approach. Prior
degrees of belief can be depicted with a graph. In such graphs, the
height of the curve above a given proportion on the horizontal axis
is not the prior probability for that proportion, rather the area
under the curve above an interval is the prior probability that the
proportion is in that interval. We call this curve the "density." In
such graphs, the height of the curve above each proportion does
not sum to 1, rather the area under the curve is 1. The following
graph, Figure 4, represents a uniform prior 0 7
106. Standard calculations yield: P(0 = .251339 of 870) - 1.9 x 100, P(0 = .7911 339 of
870) - 7.9 x 1 0 -134 , and P(O = .91339 of 870) - 4.0 x I0.2m. Finally, P(0 = .51339 of 870) is 1
minus the sum of the other posterior probabilities, a number very close to 1! That is, the
extreme nature of the evidence has put a "spike" at .5, the proportion closest to the
observed proportion 339/870. These posterior probabilities may be pictured as follows in
Figure 3 below-.
Figure 3
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107. There is a voluminous debate about whether such a prior is "noninformative" in
the sense that it represents some sort of "prior ignorance" that allows the evidence to speak
to us unencumbered. This debate is not important for the purposes of this Article.
For general discussions, see Josi M BERNARDo & ADRiAN F.M_ SMrrH, BAY'EmN THEORY
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Now, the task is to update the graph using Bayes' Theorem.
Standard calculations produce the following posterior graph
(Figure 5) for the continuous prior beliefs given above in Figure
4.108

357-67 (1994); LEE, supra note 100, at 83-86.
108. Note that the posterior is concentrated around the observed proportion 339/870.
One might combine the two approaches.
For example, one might assign a prior probability of .9 discretely to the single proportion
.791, and assign the remaining probability to remaining proportions using the area approach,
say in a uniform manner. One might depict the prior as follows:

Vol. 40:447
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Flfure 6
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The posterior can be depicted as follow,
Figure 7
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For a suggestion about how to use such a "spike and slab" approach in the jury
discrimination context, see Stephen E. Flenberg & Joseph B. Kadane, The Presentation of
Bayesian StatisticalEvidence in Legal Proceedings,32 THE STATISTICLu.N 88, 94 (1983). In any
case, none of the priors suggested here makes any real allowance for non-urn models as
alternate hypotheses.
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Figure 5
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Bayesians do not agree on how far they should go to find
analogues of frequentist approaches, especially to the extent that
frequentist approaches stem from the need for indirection, and
particularly with respect to hypothesis testing.'09 The Bayesian,
unlike the frequentist, can make probability statements about
individual hypotheses. The prior probabilities are degrees of belief
about the hypotheses before evidence is introduced. Bayes'
Theorem yields posterior degrees of belief about the hypotheses
updated according to the evidence." 0
The next subsections provide a brief introduction to some of the
suggested Bayesian analogues for dealing with the composite
hypotheses 0 -! .791 and 0 < .791.
2.

Assessing the Strength of the Evidence with Respect to a
Single Hypothesis: Bayesian P-values

Some Bayesians suggest that the Bayesian measure of the
strength of the evidence with respect to a single hypothesis is given
by the posterior probability of that hypothesis."' In the Castaneda
109. For an introduction to the issue, see LAWRENCE D. PmHups, BAYEsIAN STATISTICS FOR
SoCIAL Scmsns 333-34 (1973).
110. Note that simple hypotheses cannot be analyzed under the continuous approach
because any specific proportion has probability zero. The spike and slab approach will have
the same problem to the extent it is continuous.
111. See, e.g., CASEuA & BERGER, supra note 92, at 401. Some feel this assertion makes
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context, the obvious null hypothesis of interest is 0 - .791. In the
discrete example above, the posterior probability for this
hypothesis is the sum of the posterior probabilities for the
proportions .791 and .9. As indicated above, this sum is a
112
vanishingly small number.
In the continuous example, it is the area under the posterior curve
(see Figure 5) to the right of the proportion .791, again a
3
vanishingly small number."
3. Assessing the Strength of the Evidence with Respect to
Two Hypotheses: Bayes Factors
Some Bayesians talk about assessing the strength of evidence
with respect to two hypotheses. Recall that for simple hypotheses
A and B and observation E, the frequentist takes the likelihood
ratio, PA(E)/PB(E), to measure the strength of the evidence with
respect to the two hypotheses. As seen, however, with no grounds
for a priori distinctions between different possible values of the
proportion, it is difficult for the frequentist to generalize the law of
likelihood approach to composite hypotheses of the type at issue in
Castaneda.In the Bayesian context, however, we may compute the
ratio: P(339 in 87010 < .791)/P(339 in 87010 - .791).
It turns out that this ratio is equal to the ratio of the posterior
odds ratio to the prior odds ratio. That is, it is equal to:
P(0 < .7911 339 in 870)/ P(0 -- .791 1339 in 870)
P(0 < .791)/P(0 -- .791)
4
Either of these two equivalent ratios is called the Bayes Factor."
Some Bayesians assert that the Bayes Factor assesses the strength
of the evidence with respect to the two hypotheses because it
provides a measure of the extent to which the observed data have
5
increased or decreased the relative degrees of belief."

more sense in the situation of a noninformative prior as then the posterior degree of belief is
"solely dependent" on the evidence. See supra note 107. Indeed, in certain such situations
the posterior probability will be numerically equal to the frequentist p-value. See PRATr,
RAIFFA & SCHLAFrE, supra note 88, at 533-34; LEE, supra note 100, at 122.
112. This sum is (approximately) 7.9x10 34 + 4.0x10- 29m.
113. This area is less than 10-142.
114. See, e.g., BARNEr, supra note 4, at 216-17. Some Bayesians refer to the logarithm
of the Bayes Factor as the weight of evidence. Id.
115. See, e.g., BERNARDo AND S, m, supra note 107, at 390. It turns out that the Bayes
Factor for composite hypotheses involves weighted averages of the likelihoods of the
proportions making up the two hypotheses, where the weights depend on the prior. Cf. LEE,
supra note 100, at 119-20. Because of this dependence on the prior, some Bayesians have
trouble using this as an assessment based solely on the strength of the evidence unless the
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In both the discrete and continuous examples above, the Bayes
Factor is a very large number, indicatifig that the evidence favors 0
< .791.116

4. Bayesian Significance Tests
Significance testing may be done in the Bayesian framework. In
the Castaneda context, the obvious null hypothesis of interest is 0
- .791. A Bayesian significance test, analogous to the frequentist
significance test, can be performed by rejecting this hypothesis if
the posterior probability is small enough, according to some
predetermined criterion.11 7 As discussed above, the posterior
probability of the hypothesis 0 -> .791 is vanishingly small in both
the discrete and continuous examples.
5. Bayesian Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis testing may also be done in the Bayesian framework.
Suppose the null hypothesis 0 -- .791 is to be tested against the
alternate hypothesis 0 < .791. With the Bayesian methodology, the
posterior probabilities of these hypotheses can be directly
computed. Several strategies are possible.118 Treating the
hypotheses symmetrically, one could decide to accept the
hypothesis with the greater posterior probability, singling out the
null hypothesis only for ties. More in line with the frequentist
approach, one could single out the null hypothesis and accept the
alternate hypothesis if the posterior probability of the null
hypothesis is small according to some predetermined criterion. As
discussed above, the posterior probability of the hypothesis 0 .791 is vanishingly small in both the discrete and continuous
examples, .from which it follows that the posterior probability of
Bayes Factor is "relatively little affected within reasonable limits" by changes in the weights.
LEE, supra note 100, at 120. See also supra notes 107, 111. In the discrete example, the
Bayes Factor for two simple hypotheses turns out to be equal to the likelihood ratio
endorsed by the frequentists. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 100, at 119.
116. In the discrete example given above, the Bayes Factor for 0 < .791 versus 0 - .791
is (approximately) 3.8x1013. In the continuous example, the Bayes Factor for 0 < .791 versus
0 - .791 is at least 10141.
117. See BAmErr, supra note 4, at 214-15; BERNARDO & SMITH, supra note 107, at 413.
Other approaches have been suggested. See id. at 475-76. In any case, significance testing
raises the issue of the prior to the extent that such testing is seen as evidential. See supra
notes 107, 111, and 115.
118. See CAsELLA & BERGER, supra note 92, at 354-55. Although this is dependent on the
prior, there is no evidential issue if inference has been eschewed altogether in favor of
decisionmaking. See supra notes 107, 111, 115, and 117.
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the alternate is very close to 1 in both examples.1 19
6.

Bayesian Decision Theory

Consider again the two hypotheses 0 --.791 and 0 < .791. As
noted above, frequentist decision theorists are led to things like the
Minimax Property when they have no a priori grounds for
distinguishing among various values of 0.120 The Bayesian
perspective offers other avenues for distinguishing among decision
procedures. The Bayesian can, for example, use the prior degrees
of belief as weights to find the average (i.e. expected) value of the
risk over all possible values of the proportion. For example, the
expected risk for the Neyman-Pearson procedure in the discrete
example is:
RNp(.25)xP(O = .25) + RNP(.5)xP(O = .5)

+ RN(.791)xP(O = .791)
+ RNP(.9)xP(0 = .9), which is (approximately) .022.
This suggests the Bayes Decision Principle: use a decision
procedure that minimizes the expected risk. 2 ' Assuming the 0-1
loss structure described in the frequentist analysis, the resulting
decision procedure is to accept the hypothesis with the larger
posterior probability. 122 In the discrete example, the procedure is
to accept 0 < .791 if the number of Mexican-American grand jurors
is less than 570, and accept 0
.791 otherwise. The expected risk
for this procedure is vanishingly small.' 23

D.

What Does This Tell us About the Concept of Law as a
Discipline?
Like perspectives, which rightly gazed upon Show nothing
but confusion, eyed awry Distinguish form." 24

No doubt many mathematicians and legal scholars will complain
about the discussion presented so far. At the descriptive level,
mathematicians will point to a lack of breadth (e.g. parameter
estimation) and depth (e.g. two-sided tests). Moreover, at the
119. In the discrete example, the posterior probability of the hypothesis 0 > .791 is
(approximately) 7.9x1O-' 34 + 4.0x1O-m5, from which it follows that the posterior probability of
the hypothesis 0 < .791 is (approximately)l -(7.9x10-134 + 4.0x10 28 ). In the continuous
example, the posterior probability of the hypothesis 0 < .791 is less than 10-142,from which it
follows that the posterior probability of the hypothesis 0 < .791 is at least 1-10 -'4.
120. See BARNEr, supra note 4, at 267.
121. Id. at 267-68. Again, some provision will have to be made for ties.
122. See CASELLA & BERGER, supra note 92, at 472-78.
123. It is less than 10 20.
124. Richard H, Act H, Scene iE
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normative level, there is no discussion of the general frequentist
and Bayesian schools or of attempts to reconcile them, nor is there
any extensive evaluation of the various approaches contained
within the schools. 125 Legal scholars might have similar complaints.
For the purposes of the type of crossdisciplinary education
considered in this Article, however, the presentation is more than
sufficient. Remember that the primary goal is for students to think
about law as a discipline, not to become intelligent consumers of
various mathematical techniques. It is difficult for students to step
back and look at law as a discipline when there is no "back." The
idea of the type of crossdisciplinary education described here is to
provide students with another vantage point.
Considering mathematics as a discipline offers an opportunity for
students to think about law as a discipline. Consider, then,
mathematics as a science, an art, and a technology. 126 As a science,
mathematics deals with objects whose essential properties involve
number, shape, and function. 127
The heart of mathematical
classification is the definition-theorem-proof method. 28 As an art,
mathematics interprets using number, shape, or function in
conjunction with a medium that consists of a highly refined
symbolic language. 129 Finally, mathematics as a technology is used
125. The reader can start with BARNErr, supra note 4; GmnS, supra note ; ROYALL,
supra note 38; WEATHERFORD, supra note 46.
126.

See MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS: A CULTURAL APPROACH 1-10 (1962).
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL BOARD ON MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICAL
SCIENCES: SOME RESEARCH TRENDS 21 (1988).

127. See

128. See, e.g., Y. MANIN, A COURSE IN MATHEMATICAL LOGI 48 (1977) (stating "the ideal
for what constitutes a mathematical demonstration of a 'nonobvious truth' has remained
unchanged since the time of Euclid; we must arrive at such a truth from 'obvious'
hypotheses, or assertions which have already been proved, by means of a series of explicitly
described, 'obviously valid' elementary deductions"). This is the "ideal," but the required rigor
has changed from time to time. See Wilder, Relativity of Standards of Mathematical Rigor, 3
DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 170 (1973); see also Grabiner, Is Mathematical Truth
Time-Dependent?, 814AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 354 (1974).

129. See Henri Poincar6, The Relations of Analysis and Mathematical Physics, 4 BULL
Am. MATHEMATICAL Soc'Y 247, 248 (1898) (stating "[Mathematics has] an end esthetic ....
[A]depts find in mathematics delights analogous to those that painting and music give. They
admire the delicate harmony of number and of forms; they are amazed when a new
discovery discloses for them an unlooked for perspective . . . "). For other discussions of
mathematics as an art, see NATHAN A. COURT, MATHEMATICS INFUN AND EARNEST 12740 (1964);
P.R. Halmos, Mathematics as a Creative Art, 56 An SCIENTIsr 375 (1968); J.W.N. Sullivan,
Mathematics As an Art, in ASPECTS OF SCIENCE: SECOND SERIES 80 (1926); Henri Poincar6,
Mathematical Creation, SCL An., Aug. 1948, at 54. See also Scorr BUCHANNAN, POMcRY AND
MATHEMATICS (1929); JERRY P. KING, THE ART OF MATHEMATICS (1992).

Many mathematicians

exalt this dimension of mathematics above all others. See Lynn A. Steen, Mathematics
Tbday, in MATHEMATICS TODAY 1, 10 (Lynn A. Steen ed., 1978) (stating "beauty and elegance
have more to do with the value of a mathematical idea than does either strict truth or

484

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:447

to solve problems that can be modeled in terms of number, shape,
and function. 130 Mathematics can be used as a kind of "mirror" to
examine the scientific, artistic, and technological components of
law. The goal should be less to develop a full picture of law as a
discipline, than to impart to students an understanding of what
such an enterprise entails.
For example, students can consider law as an art. One of the
artistic aspects of mathematics involves the idea of the "elegant" or
"ingenious" proof.13' One can begin a crossdisciplinary course of
the type envisioned here with an axiomatic treatment of
probability, and students can be asked to do proofs! Homework
will provide examples where students can be asked to compare
their solutions along these artistic lines. Students can then consider
a similar situation in law, the "elegant" or "ingenious" opinion. An
earlier article hints how this might be done using Cardozo's
well-known Allegheny College opinion. 132
As an example of what might be done to get students to think
about law as a science, students can be asked whether they find
the standard casebook "note problems" any more or less difficult
than the "word problems" in the quantitative methods course, and
if so, why.
Instead of considering the components of law individually,
students can think about the relation between them. The
frequentist-Bayesian divide presents an excellent opportunity for
students to think about the relation between law as a science and
law as a technology. The scientific aspect of probability and
statistics is encompassed by the axiomatic study of certain sets and
functions. As mentioned above, the frequentist-Bayesian debate is
less an argument about the axiomatics than it is a fundamental
disagreement about the proper technological stance associated with
such axiomatic systems. The mathematician A.N. Kolmogorov, who
possible utility."); see also G.I HARDY, A MATHEMAncAN's APOLOGY (3d prtg. 1967).
130. For a general discussion with a number of interesting examples, see Felix E.
Browder & Saunders MacLane, The Relevance of Mathematics, in MATREMATIcs TODAY 323
(Lrnn A. Steen ed., 1978).
131. See generally, WwLAM DUNHAM, JOURNEY THROUGH GENIUS: THE GREAT THEOREMS OF

MATHEMAICS (1990).
132. See supra text accompanying note 27. Another aspect of mathematical elegance
involves parsimony in the choice of axioms. See, e.g. RAYMOND L WILDER, EvoION OF
MATHEMATICAL CONCEPT'S 9 (1968). In fact, axiom systems for probability provide a good
illustration, and the point can be emphasized in class as the presentation unfolds. Students
can then be asked to think about similar situations in law. For example, students can be
asked to think about the "mailbox rules" in the contract Restatements.
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provided one of the earliest axiomatic treatments of probability,
was well aware of the basic distinction between science and
technology in this area:
The theory of probability, as a mathematical discipline, can
and should be developed from axioms in exactly the same way
as Geometry and Algebra. This means that after we have
defined the elements to be studied and their basic relations,
and have stated the axioms by which these relations are to be
governed, all further exposition must be based exclusively on
these axioms, independent of the usual concrete meaning of
these elements and their relationsY3
Indeed, students can study the axiomatics independent of any
discussion of technological interpretations. Students can be told
that the usual sorts of problems involving dice and cards are stated
so as to provide a shorthand for various complicated sets and
functions. After students have worked through the basic
framework, the frequentist-Bayesian divide can be presented. This
provides an excellent example of the stark distinctions that can be
drawn between the scientific and technological components of a
discipline. On the other hand, the dice and card examples can be
reintroduced in pointing out that the development of the field of
probability is due largely to the investigation of a number of
practical problems. 13 This reminds students that the scientific and
technological components of a discipline often are symbiotic and
cannot be separated too neatly. With this background, students can
be asked about the relation between law as a science and law as a
technology.
Students also can think about the current evolution of law as a
discipline. Although opinion on Bayesian methods has swung back
and forth over the past two centuries, the recent interest in
Bayesian techniques is traceable in part to the general availability
of modern computing power.13 Assignments utilizing statistical
software will make the impact of computing power clear. Students
can be asked to consider the effect of legal databases on law as a
discipline. For example, according to one legal scholar.
133.
134.

AN. KOLMOGOROV, FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY 1 (1956).
See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 11-12 (1984).

135. See, e.g., GEORGE E.P. Box & GEORGE C. TiAo, BAYESIAN INFERENCE IN
STATISTICALNALYSIS 1 (1973); cf. ANDREW GELMAN, JOHN B. CARLIN, HAL S. STERN & DONALD B.
Ruinm, BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS 3-4 (1995).
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To use the computer, we have to think like a computer. The
more we think in a highly simplified, individual-word fashion,
the'more effective our computer searches will be. But the
more. we think in computerese, the further we move from our
traditional way of "thinking like a lawyer."13
Students also can discuss specific legal doctrine. Castaneda
suggests some interesting questions about the prima facie case in
discrimination suits. In making out the prima facie case in
Castaneda, plaintiff was not required to adjust the statistical
analysis for statutorily prescribed qualifications, 3 7 nor was plaintiff
required to present a separate analysis for other possible time
frames. ' -8 In the terminology of this Article, the prima facie case
has a scientific aspect as a type of classification device. A prima
facie case results in a preliminary classification that will become
permanent in the absence of a rebuttal. However, the prima facie
case also has a technological aspect. For example, in terms of
allocating relative burdens, the elements .of a prima facie case
might depend on issues such as which party is in a better position
to maintain and bring forth certain types of data.'3 In this sense,
there is an interesting contrast with general statistical practice. If
plaintiff's statistical brief were to be turned into an analysis for a
statistics journal, he would be required to consider the adjustments
described above before making any conclusion. Indeed, the
unavailability of relevant data for making the adjustments might be
a fatal blow to publication. Given this contrast, students can be
asked to think about the nature and use of the prima facie case in
40
discrimination suits.
136. Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the
Computer Age, 88 LAw LIB. J. 338, 346 (1996). See also Susan W. Brenner, PRECEDENT
INFRATION (1992); Carol Bast & Ransford Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A
Paradigm Shift?, 93 LAw Lin. J. 285 (2001); Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of
the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L REV. 9
(1994); Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance,
75 CALIF. L REv. 15 (1987).
137. These qualifications were that the grand juror be a citizen of Texas and the
county, be of sound mind and good moral character, be literate, have no prior felony
conviction, and be under no pending indictment or other legal accusation for theft or of any
felony. 430 U.S. at 484.
138. Plaintiff considered an 11-year time frame. The State District Commissioner at the
time of plaintiff's indictment had been in office only 2 1/2years. 430 U.S. at 496 n.16.
139. See Sara Sun Beale, Integrating Statistical Evidence and Legal Theory to
Challenge the Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors, 46 LAw & CONTrEMP. PROBs. 269, 272-73
(1983).
140. For example, students might start with something like Kingsley R. Browne,
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The different mathematical methodologies described in Part III
suggest several questions. Is the classification in Castaneda
"objective" or "subjective"? Put perhaps a second way, is the
classification involved in Castaneda about "facts," "beliefs about
facts," or something else? Put perhaps a third way; is "proof,"
"persuasion," or something else the appropriate cognate as it
relates to Castaneda? The frequentist-Bayesian divide illustrates
the potential importance of these questions. Even assuming a
cognate with mathematical significance, is the ultimate job
inference or decisionmaking?14 2 If inference, is it about assessing
(the strength of) evidence (with respect to hypotheses) or about
assessing (th validity of) hypotheses? Is there only a single
hypothesis of interest, or are two hypotheses to be considered? Do
the answers depend on the prima facie context? The p-value, law
of likelihood, significance test, hypothesis test, and general
decision-theoretic approaches indicate the potential importance of
these questions. Finally, the Bayesian approach suggests questions
about the exact nature of the presumption of innocence.143 This list
of questions is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Others will
no doubt suggest themselves to the reader.
It is not suggested that all students take a quantitative methods
course, but law schools should consider developing a range of
"capstone" courses at the crossdisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and
transdisciplinary levels. In any case, legal education should
encourage students to think along such lines throughout their
careers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many jobs that now require a college degree do so only out of
Statistical Proof of Discrimination:Beyond Damned Lies, 68 WASI. L REV. 477 (1993).
141. For example, students might start with something like Ronald J. Allen, The Nature
of JuridicalProof, 13 CARDoZo L REv. 373, 393-96 (1991); Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J.
Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence
and for Legal Decisionmaking,66 B.U.L REv. 771 (1986); Craig R. Allen, Some Limits on the
Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. LJ. 1 (1982).
142. For example, students might start with something like John Kaplan, Decision
Theory and the Fac~findingProcess, 68 STAN. L REV. 1065 (1968).
143. For example, students might start with something like Lawrence Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L REv. 1329, 1368-72
(1971); Lawrence Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARv. L REv. 1810,
1815-17 (1971); Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, The Continuing Debate over
Mathematics in the Law of Evidence, 84 HAv. L REV. 1801, 1807-09 (1971); Fienberg &
Kadane, supra note 108, at 92-93.
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professional tradition or expectations, rather than an inherent
need for four years or more of higher education. Lawyers are
a good example. Most of a lawyer's skills can be obtained
from a paralegal school and a good high school forensics
class. This would be more cost-effective than seven years of
higher education .... 1
This Article is part of a work in progress. The goal of this project
is to illustrate how one might consider law as a discipline. There is
no claim that the approach sketched in this sequence of articles is
the only approach, but American law schools must do more in this
regard. One reason is obvious. Such a consideration is the sign of a
mature subject area. There is, however, another important reason.
In today's world, traditional education 'providers (i.e. colleges and
universities) are facing increasing competition from nontraditional
rivals. Education providers who do not think carefully about the
nature of their offering will not be able to compete with those who
do. Simply put, serious thinking by the current professoriate about
law as a discipline may be a matter of survival.

144. Andrew Peyton, Wrench-Wrestling vs. Pencil-Pushing, THE
58 Sept/Oct (1996).

AmmrcmN ENTERPRISE,

